3  Where Markets Come From

What are markets, and when do they fail?

NoteLearning Objectives
  • Explain why “the free market” is a description of a rule-bound institution, not an absence of rules.
  • Name and give examples of four kinds of market failure.
  • Say who bears the cost and who captures the benefit in a negative externality.

“Which product in this room is unregulated?” The answer, once you start looking, is none of them. Every object on the shelf exists inside a web of rules about who may sell it, what counts as fraud, who is liable when it fails, and how disputes get resolved. “The free market” is not the absence of rules; it is a particular set of them.

The journalist Tom Wainwright made the same point from the other direction. In order to show how the free market really works, he went and studied it in its pure, unconstrained form: the cocaine cartels (Wainwright 2017). Even there, the rules did not disappear. A cartel can’t use trademark law, but it can use violence against competitors who sell adulterated product under the same name. The aim—maintaining exclusivity and quality signals—is the same; only the mechanism differs. Markets do not exist without rules. The interesting questions are which rules exist, who wrote them, and who benefits.

The cartel comparison is more than a joke. Legal markets solve the same problems through contract law, trademark protection, employment law, and litigation; cartels solve them through violence because those protections do not exist. Their labor relations are brutal not because the people are worse but because the legal protections that prevent brutality in legal labor markets have been removed. Their vertical integration is deeper because they cannot sue a supplier who fails to deliver. A highly concentrated firm in any industry can externalize harm without losing market share, and can use its political leverage to shift costs onto workers, communities, and governments. Cartels exhibit the pattern in its extreme form because they face the weakest institutional constraints, but the logic is not different in kind from what large platforms do.

3.1 Markets Are Made of Rules

The idea that markets arise naturally and rules are later imposed on them gets the history backwards. David Graeber spent years studying debt across cultures and centuries, and found that the story economists tell about money— that barter came first, that money was invented to make barter easier, and that credit developed on top of money— has almost no support in the historical record. The fish-for-axes economy of introductory textbooks never existed. What appears instead are systems of mutual obligation: I owe you, you owe me, the village keeps track. Credit is older than markets and older than money, and money emerged not to simplify barter but to settle and record debts (Graeber 2011).

Even the creation of money turns out to be a rule-bound, and faintly ridiculous, institution. In the 1660s, London goldsmiths began issuing paper receipts for the gold and silver stored in their vaults, and merchants discovered it was easier to pay each other with receipts than to cart metal through the streets. The goldsmiths then noticed that only a fraction of depositors ever came to claim their metal, so they issued more receipts than they had gold, lending out the difference and collecting interest. When a modern bank makes a loan, it does not lend out money that was previously deposited; it creates the deposit at the same moment it creates the loan. Money that did not exist comes into existence through the act of lending, and when the loan is repaid, that money is destroyed (Michael McLeay and Thomas 2014). Who gets to create money, and under what constraints, has always been a political question dressed up as a technical one.

The mechanism is also the origin of the bank run. When depositors suspect that the receipts exceed the gold, everyone tries to claim their metal at once, which confirms the suspicion and guarantees the collapse. In September 2007, people queued outside branches of Northern Rock, a British mortgage lender, for three days—the first run on a British bank in 150 years. The queues were orderly and very British, but the mechanism was identical to panics that had destroyed banks in Amsterdam in 1763, in the United States repeatedly between 1873 and 1907, and in Argentina in 2001.

Andrew Jackson ran his 1832 presidential campaign substantially on whether a private institution should have the power to create the country’s money. The panics that followed eventually produced the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, passed in the aftermath of the 1907 panic, to give the money-creation system a lender of last resort.

Contemporary fintech companies are participating in this argument without acknowledging it. Klarna, Afterpay, and Affirm extend credit at the point of purchase. In doing so they are creating money, but without the deposit insurance, capital requirements, or regulatory oversight that apply to licensed banks. PayPal holds tens of billions of dollars in customer balances that do not carry deposit insurance, and Stripe extends credit to merchants. These companies capture the profit of money creation while avoiding the obligations that historically came with it— the same maneuver the London goldsmiths discovered in the 1660s.

Other “natural” features of markets are legal grants. Limited liability—the rule that an investor can lose no more than they put in— was not a spontaneous invention of commerce. It was created by governments to encourage private investment in ventures too risky for one person to fund alone, appearing with the Dutch East India Company in 1602 and changing who was willing to invest, in what, and on what scale. Copyright has the same character. The Statute of Anne, enacted in England in 1710, is generally called the first copyright law, but it was passed not to protect authors but to break the monopoly of the London Stationers’ Company, a printers’ guild, and to replace it with a new system of publisher monopolies operating for limited terms. Authors received rights in the statute only to the extent that they assigned them to publishers, who were the real beneficiaries (Bracha 2019). The framing of copyright as a natural right of creators was a later construction that reversed the actual history— and the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was timed, notoriously, to keep the earliest Mickey Mouse films out of the public domain.

Even the idea of a rational economic agent is a political argument dressed as mathematics. The figure travels from Hobbes’s self-interested subject, through Herbert Spencer’s “survival of the fittest,” to the utility-maximizing rational actor of neoclassical economics. Each step converted a claim about how people ought to behave into a description of how they naturally do, and the description has consequences: it suggests that whoever wins under current rules wins because the rules are fair. “Deregulation” is best understood the same way. It is never the removal of rules; it is the substitution of one set of rules for another, and the new rules have winners and losers just as the old ones did.

3.3 Four Ways Markets Fail

A market fails when an unadjusted market produces an outcome that is neither efficient nor fair. There are four standard mechanisms, each with a technology-shaped example.

The first is externalities: costs or benefits imposed on third parties that the price does not capture. Pollution is the classic negative externality; misinformation, polarization, and teen anxiety are its digital descendants, imposed at scale and priced at zero. A less obvious externality sits behind the automation debate. In a competitive market, an automating firm captures the full cost savings from replacing workers but bears only a fraction of the resulting destruction of consumer demand. Every firm therefore has a rational-as-in-psychopathic incentive to automate beyond the socially optimal level, because the gain from cutting labor costs outweighs the diffuse, shared consequence of eliminating consumer spending (Falk and Tsoukalas 2026). Henry Ford understood the opposite logic: his employees needed to earn enough to buy his cars. The AI economy is eliminating the workers and expecting the cars to keep selling (McGrann 2026).

The second is public goods: goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, like an informed electorate, institutional trust, or online safety. No one can be made to pay for them, and one person’s use does not diminish another’s, so markets under-produce them. Every firm has an incentive to free-ride on the trust that others maintain, and no single company has an incentive to build it alone.

The third is information asymmetry. In George Akerlof’s “market for lemons,” when the seller knows much more than the buyer about the quality of a used car, the bad cars drive out the good ones, because buyers can’t tell the difference and won’t pay for quality (Akerlof 1978). The same logic governs a recommendation system: you do not know what the recommender is doing, or why, and the operator does. When one party to a transaction can see the whole board and the other can see only their own move, the outcome is not a fair trade.

The fourth is market power. Network effects and switching costs produce concentration, sometimes a “natural monopoly,” and the ability to set terms rather than take them. Here the technology industry runs a remarkably effective piece of theater. Apple positions itself as the champion of privacy in explicit contrast to Google’s surveillance-funded model, a rivalry performed with the moral intensity of professional wrestling. The industry term for such a collective fiction is kayfabe, and what the performance obscures is that Apple earns roughly $20 billion a year from a deal that makes Google the default search engine on every iPhone sold (Barthes 1972). The two rivals are financially interdependent, and each needs the other to keep playing its designated role.

3.4 The Commons and the Lock-In

To the four standard failures, add a fifth idea: the commons. Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” described an unmanaged commons he never studied, and Elinor Ostrom spent her career documenting what he missed: communities that govern shared resources sustainably for centuries, without either private ownership or state control, through locally developed rules, monitoring, and graduated sanctions (Ostrom 2015). The historically managed commons of medieval England, the Alpine meadows of Switzerland, the forest communities of Japan, and the irrigation systems of Valencia and Bali all governed shared resources sustainably, in some cases for centuries. Ostrom identified eight design principles that successful self-governing commons tend to share: clearly defined rights to the resource; rules adapted to local conditions rather than imposed from outside; meaningful input from the people affected by the rules; monitoring of both the resource and the users; graduated sanctions; cheap and rapid conflict resolution; recognition by external authorities of the community’s right to self-organize; and nested governance for larger systems. The commons did not inevitably collapse; the argument that it did was made by enclosure’s beneficiaries and repeated long after it was refuted.

Platform lock-in is the digital descendant of the same contest over who gets to set the rules. Apple’s green-bubble effect is a case study in manufactured switching costs: internal documents admitted that adopting the RCS messaging standard would reduce the social cost of leaving the iPhone, and Apple declined to do it until the European Union’s Digital Markets Act forced support in 2024. The sharecropping system that spread across the post-Civil-War American South offers the sharpest metaphor for what that lock-in feels like. A farmer pledged next year’s crop to cover this year’s debt, buying supplies on credit at the landowner’s store at prices the landowner set, so that a bad harvest—or a good one, depending on how the accounts were kept— left the farmer owing more at year’s end than at the beginning (Blackmon 2008). The platform equivalent runs through percentage fees, arbitrary algorithmic changes, and paid promotion. The audience is the crop; the algorithm change is the landlord raising the rent after the harvest is in.

3.5 The Monopolist’s Playbook

Venture-funded platform competition is a tontine. In European finance from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, a tontine was a pooled investment in which, as each subscriber died, the remaining subscribers’ shares increased, with the last survivor inheriting the fund. Most governments eventually banned tontines because they created obvious incentives to hasten other participants’ deaths. In platform competition, the explicit goal from the first investment round is to be the one platform that achieves dominance while all competitors fail. Operating below cost to build market share, sometimes for years, makes financial sense if it eliminates alternatives and enables the extraction of monopoly rents afterward. Investors who hold positions in multiple competing platforms profit regardless of which one wins; the workers, users, and communities that depended on those platforms do not.

The life cycle of a dominant firm in a network industry follows a pattern: enter with a genuinely useful product, use that position to acquire or drive out competitors, then extract maximum value from the resulting captive market. Standard Oil, the railway companies, the Bell telephone system, cable television, and the major record labels all followed this playbook. At its peak, Standard Oil controlled roughly ninety percent of US oil refining capacity. It did not achieve this through superior efficiency but through secret railroad rebates, predatory pricing, and strategic acquisitions. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was written in direct response, and the 1911 Supreme Court decision that broke Standard Oil into thirty-four companies is often cited as the definitive antitrust remedy. What is less often noted is that several successor companies immediately reconsolidated, and that John D. Rockefeller’s personal fortune increased after the breakup as the stock prices of the subsidiaries rose. The remedy addressed the legal structure of the monopoly without altering the underlying concentration of power.

The Bell network evolved differently. AT&T’s control over telephone infrastructure from the 1910s until its breakup in 1984 was maintained by a regulatory compact: AT&T accepted rate regulation in exchange for a protected monopoly position. That compact produced genuine achievements. Bell Labs generated an extraordinary concentration of fundamental research, including the transistor, the laser, information theory, and Unix. It also suppressed competitive long-distance service and technologies that threatened the core telephone business.

The British railway mania of the 1840s followed the same cycle earlier and more visibly. Over 400 new railway projects were approved between 1844 and 1846. When the bubble collapsed, it destroyed several major banks and left behind a network of railways that, once consolidated, actually worked. Parliament responded with rate controls and mandated third-party access to track, which the railway companies contested for decades, making the same arguments that social media and AI companies make today: the industry was too complex to regulate effectively, regulation would destroy investment incentives, and the market would eventually take care of things anyway.

Antitrust enforcement has provided limited relief because acquisitions of potential competitors are evaluated on whether they raised consumer prices immediately— not whether they reduced competition structurally. Beginning in the 1970s, a legal school argued that courts should evaluate mergers solely on whether they reduced consumer welfare in the short run. Under this standard, acquiring a nascent competitor was not anticompetitive if the acquired company had not yet raised prices. Platform companies used this framework to acquire dozens of potential competitors before they could grow large enough to threaten market share. The current debate over platform regulation is therefore partly a debate about whether antitrust law should return to its original concern with concentration of power.

3.6 Intellectual Property as Invention

Copyright, patent, and trademark are not natural rights: they are legal instruments invented at specific times to serve specific interests. The expansion of intellectual property rights over the past forty years was a deliberate political project, pursued by specific industries, over the objections of economists who predicted—correctly—that it would harm innovation. The Statute of Anne, discussed above, was passed to break a printers’ monopoly, not to protect authors. Terms have been extended repeatedly, almost always to be longer, broader, and to allow fewer exceptions. United States copyright terms have moved from 14 years under the Copyright Act of 1790 to the current life-plus-70 years. The 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was timed to prevent the earliest Mickey Mouse films from entering the public domain. Each extension was the result of lobbying by specific industries, over the objections of economists who argued that the existing terms were already longer than necessary to incentivize creation.

Pharmaceutical companies have been especially effective at shaping the law globally. Beginning with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, high-income countries required all members of the World Trade Organization to adopt patent standards that matched or exceeded their own. Countries that had deliberately excluded pharmaceutical products from patentability in order to build domestic generic drug industries— including India, Brazil, and several African countries— were required to change their laws. The result was a substantial transfer of rents to pharmaceutical companies in rich countries, and a significant increase in drug prices in countries that could least afford them.

Software patents are a category whose practical operation differs substantially from the stated purpose of the patent system. The original argument for patents is that they encourage disclosure: an inventor gets a time-limited monopoly in exchange for publishing a description sufficient to let others replicate the invention. Software patents are often written at high levels of abstraction, covering broad categories of computational method rather than specific implementations. They are concentrated in the portfolios of large technology companies, financial institutions, and patent assertion entities: organizations that hold patents without producing anything, and derive revenue entirely from licensing and litigation. Software patents are used primarily against smaller companies and open source projects, which lack the resources to defend extended litigation.

Open source licensing emerged in part as a response to this expansion. The GNU Public License and its relatives use copyright law against itself: the license grants broad permissions that apply only on the condition that derivative works carry the same license, making it legally difficult to take open source software and close it. This kind of copyleft has been only a partial success: big tech companies have learned to extract enormous value from open source software while contributing relatively little back, because their primary product is not the software but the service running on it.

3.7 Setting the Standard

In May 1886, American railroads completed the largest coordinated industrial operation the country had seen. Over two days, work crews across the South pulled up thousands of miles of track and relaid it three inches closer together, converting the region’s idiosyncratic gauge to match the rest of the country. The southern railroads had resisted for decades because the incompatibility was not an accident. Different gauges meant that northern rolling stock could not run on southern track, so freight crossing a gauge boundary had to be unloaded, transferred, and reloaded. Every cargo shipment lost time and money at the border, and that money went to the carriers who controlled the boundary. The technical choice was a market weapon. A technical standard is an agreement about how things connect. The value of having a standard usually far exceeds the value of any particular outcome in the format war that precedes it, which is exactly why control of the format is worth fighting for.

Thomas Edison understood this in the 1880s, when he and George Westinghouse fought over whether the United States would run on direct or alternating current. Edison had bet on DC infrastructure and stood to lose if AC won, so he electrocuted animals at exhibitions and lobbied for AC to be used in the first electric chair, hoping to fix the association of alternating current with execution in the public mind. None of this changed the underlying physics; AC transmits over longer distances at lower cost, and Westinghouse won.

A century later, Microsoft repeatedly used standards capture as a business strategy. The company would adopt an open standard like HTML, Java, or Kerberos authentication, then add proprietary extensions that were convenient but tied developers to Microsoft’s version. Once enough code was written against the extensions, interoperability with non-Microsoft systems degraded. The strategy had a name inside the company: embrace, extend, extinguish.

Google’s Accelerated Mobile Pages, launched in 2015, was presented as an open standard for fast-loading mobile web pages. To receive preferential treatment in Google’s mobile search results, however, pages had to be hosted on Google’s own servers and delivered through Google’s infrastructure. Publishers who adopted AMP handed Google control over their content delivery in exchange for a favorable page rank. Google eventually backed away from the hosting requirement, but only under regulatory pressure.

When a technology becomes embedded in a formal standard, the patent holder typically commits to license it on FRAND terms: fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. This sounds reassuring, but the word “reasonable” has funded decades of litigation. Qualcomm’s licensing of mobile baseband patents was subject to antitrust proceedings simultaneously in the United States, Europe, South Korea, China, and Taiwan in the late 2010s. The core allegation was consistent across jurisdictions: Qualcomm was charging fees that bore no relationship to any recognizable interpretation of “reasonable.” The outcomes varied by country; Qualcomm remained profitable throughout.

If you are a developer building a product, every choice between an open standard and a proprietary API is a bet on the future behavior of the platform that owns the API. History suggests the bet is a bad one. From Instagram’s third-party API and Twitter/X’s developer API to Google Reader and Firebase’s original pricing structure, platforms have repeatedly changed terms after developers are so invested that they can’t walk away. Each time, the platform points to its terms of service, which always reserve the right to change. The structural remedy is an interoperability mandate: a legal requirement that platforms accept connections from competing services on terms that do not depend on the platform’s goodwill. Phone number portability eliminated one of the most effective lock-in mechanisms in telecoms. Messaging interoperability requirements in the EU’s Digital Markets Act are attempting to do the same thing for social platforms.

3.8 Public Subsidy, Private Profit

When Steve Jobs unveiled the iPhone in 2007, the crowd responded as if Apple had conjured something from nothing. What the applause missed was that every technology in the device had been developed with government money: the internet from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, GPS from the US Air Force, the touchscreen from National Science Foundation-funded research, and Siri from a DARPA-funded project at SRI International. The government took the risk; the shareholders reaped the benefit (Mazzucato 2015).

The drug industry runs the same arrangement at enormous scale. The mRNA platform behind the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines was built over decades by Katalin Karikó and Drew Weissman at the University of Pennsylvania, supported by the National Institutes of Health. When COVID-19 hit, the US government funded the trials and pre-purchased hundreds of millions of doses before any vaccine was authorized. The government provided the science, the capital, and the guaranteed market. Moderna became a $200 billion company, and the NIH’s claim to a share of the intellectual property— which would have given the public some leverage over pricing— was disputed and ultimately not enforced. Marianna Mazzucato calls this arrangement the privatization of gains and the socialization of losses.

The pattern is not unique to Apple. The internet began as ARPANET, funded by the Department of Defense from 1969 to connect university research computers. The initial packet-switching protocols, the domain name system, and the basic architecture of what became the web were developed in publicly funded laboratories and universities. The commercial internet of the 1990s built on this foundation without paying for it. The browser itself emerged from the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, funded by the National Science Foundation. Mosaic was not a startup product; it was a research project paid for by American taxpayers.

The drug industry runs the same arrangement at enormous scale. The National Institutes of Health spends roughly $47 billion annually on biomedical research. Much of that money funds the basic science that pharmaceutical companies would not fund themselves because the returns are too distant and uncertain. When that basic science produces a promising compound, private companies license it, conduct clinical trials, and patent the result. The public paid for the underlying knowledge; the private company captures the patent and sets the price. Unlike every other wealthy country, the United States has no legal mechanism to negotiate that price. As a result, insulin costs American patients ten times what Canadians pay.

The arrangement looks different in Europe, partly because European governments built in mechanisms that Americans left out. Germany’s Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, a network of applied research institutes funded jointly by the federal government, state governments, and industry, licenses its discoveries under terms that return revenue to the institutes rather than transferring intellectual property to private buyers at knockdown prices. The European Medicines Agency negotiates drug prices on behalf of member states, which is why the same cancer drugs that cost American patients six figures a year cost German and French patients a fraction of that. When Moderna tried to sell COVID-19 vaccines to the European Union, EU negotiators paid roughly half the per-dose price that American buyers paid, for the same product developed with the same publicly funded science. The European model still lets private firms profit substantially from public investment. What it does not do is treat the transfer as a gift.

China has taken a third path. Programs like Made in China 2025 identify strategic industries like semiconductors, electric vehicles, robotics, and artificial intelligence, and pour in state capital with the explicit goal of domestic ownership of the results, not just the benefits. Companies like CATL, which now supplies roughly a third of the world’s electric vehicle batteries, grew to global scale with protected home markets and state-backed financing. The distinction between public and private is deliberately blurry: the government can require access to technology developed with state support, block the international transfer of profits, and redirect corporate strategy in ways American or European regulators legally cannot. This solves the problem Mazzucato describes, since the state that takes the foundational risk never fully loses its claim on the result. It creates a different problem: accountability runs upward to the Communist Party rather than outward to citizens, and the line between a national champion and an instrument of state policy disappears.

The cycle closes with tax. Apple’s arrangements in Ireland allowed it to pay an effective tax rate of 0.005% on European profits. The mechanism was a variant of the Double Irish: Apple’s Irish subsidiaries were incorporated in Ireland but had their management and control located outside Ireland, so Ireland did not tax them, and they were not incorporated in the United States, so the US did not tax them either. The Dutch Sandwich added a Netherlands entity to the chain, exploiting a Dutch provision that exempted certain royalty payments from withholding tax. Royalties flowed from Ireland to the Netherlands and onward to a zero-tax jurisdiction, each step reducing the amount captured by any country that might want to tax it. Luxembourg served a similar function for Amazon; Google’s arrangement was elaborate enough to have its own nickname, the Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich.

The OECD’s BEPS project, launched in 2013, produced a fifteen-point action plan to close these loopholes. The 2021 agreement among 136 countries on a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% went further than any previous multilateral effort. It established the principle that no matter where a multinational’s profits were booked, at least 15% would be paid somewhere. The agreement was called historic, which was accurate, and transformative, which was not, since implementation depended on each country passing domestic legislation. Gabriel Zucman estimates that roughly 40% of multinational profits are shifted to tax havens annually, costing governments approximately $200 billion per year in corporate tax revenue. This is money that does not fund schools, infrastructure, or healthcare in the countries where the economic activity actually occurred. Public investment creates the technology, private firms capture the profits, and international tax structures ensure that only a tiny fraction of those profits flows back to the public budget.

3.9 Enshittification

Cory Doctorow gave the platform life cycle a name: enshittification (Doctorow 2025). A platform first attracts users with a genuinely useful service, then locks in its business customers, then harvests both by degrading service quality, raising prices, and extracting the maximum value from a market it now controls.

The ladder has concrete rungs. Booking.com offered hotels a 12% commission in the mid-2000s to bring them customers, became the dominant hotel-search platform across Europe, and by 2019 was charging many hotels 25-30% plus fees for “preferred placement.” Columbia House ran the same play in an earlier era: a penny bought you twelve records, but the fine print committed you to buying eight more at “regular club prices” two to three times the retail price. JanSport’s backpacks followed a different route to the same destination: after a single corporation bought most of the durable-backpack brands, fabric thickness dropped, zippers weakened, and the lifetime warranty was rewritten to exclude precisely the failures that were now designed into the product. When YouTube changed its monetization criteria in 2018 to require a thousand subscribers and four thousand watch hours, channels that had not yet crossed the threshold were cut off from income they had been building toward, on a platform that owned the audience they had grown.

Enshittification is not a bug in an otherwise healthy system; it is the logical end of network effects and structural lock-in, protected from competitive correction because the switching costs that trap users also insulate the platform from consequences (Doctorow and Giblin 2022).

3.10 Bubbles and Greater Fools

Markets fail not only when they are captured, but when they stop reflecting anything except the behavior of other traders. In February 1637, a single bulb of the Semper Augustus tulip sold in Amsterdam for the price of a house on a canal (Mackay 1841). Isaac Newton, one of the smartest people who ever lived, lost the equivalent of several million dollars in the South Sea Bubble of 1720, reportedly observing afterward that he could calculate the motions of heavenly bodies but not the madness of men.

The greater fool theory explains how this keeps happening: you do not have to believe a tulip is worth a house, only that someone else will pay you more for it next month than you paid today. Robert Shiller argues that markets are driven less by rational calculation than by contagious stories, in a feedback loop he calls narrative economics: a compelling story changes behavior, changed behavior changes prices, and rising prices seem to confirm the story (Shiller 2015). A bubble collapses when no greater fool can be found.

The pattern is not confined to tulips. Britain’s railway mania of the 1840s combined genuine technological transformation with genuine investment needs to produce something close to collective insanity. Between 1844 and 1846, Parliament approved over 400 new railway projects. Engineers, lawyers, and promoters collected fees regardless of whether the lines were ever built. Ordinary investors poured savings into railways that had no surveyed routes, no locomotives, and sometimes no identifiable board of directors. When the bubble collapsed, it wiped out a significant fraction of the British middle class and destroyed several major banks, but it left behind a network of railways that, once consolidated, actually worked. Bubbles are destructive for investors, but sometimes productive for infrastructure.

The dot-com crash of 2000 wiped out trillions of dollars in market value and left behind fiber-optic cable, server farms, and the engineering knowledge to run large-scale internet services cheaply. Most of the companies that failed deserved to fail: their business models assumed that selling pet food online at a loss, while paying for national television advertising, would eventually produce a profit. The crash was the market performing its nominal function of reallocating capital away from bad ideas. The problem was that the reallocation happened after several hundred thousand people lost their jobs and several million lost their retirement savings.

The housing bubble that collapsed in 2008 followed a different structure because it was built on debt rather than equity. Banks lent money to people who could not repay it, packaged the loans into securities sold to pension funds and insurance companies, bought insurance against those securities from companies that could not pay out, and collected fees at every stage. The economists who designed the risk models assumed, based on historical data, that housing prices never declined nationally at the same time. They were right until they were catastrophically wrong. Crucially, the losses did not fall on the banks that had made the bad loans: the US government covered those. The losses fell on homeowners who lost their houses and workers who lost their jobs when the economy contracted.

Which brings us to AI. Large language models are genuinely impressive. The companies building them have produced tools that fundamentally change how people write and program. But the valuations of AI companies have, since roughly 2023, been running well ahead of their revenue, their profit margins, and any plausible estimate of the addressable market. The story driving those valuations is that AI will soon be able to do everything, which is a story that has been told before about nuclear power, and about previous generations of expert systems and neural networks. This doesn’t mean AI companies will collapse to nothing, any more than railways did. The real question is who will capture the value and who will absorb the cost when reality catches up with the hype. Historically, the engineers and founders who cashed out early do well. The pension funds, retail investors, and laid-off workers who arrived later do not, while the people who collected fees at every stage do best of all.

3.11 Fraud Is a Business Model

Fraud is more common than prosecutions suggest, and its most dangerous forms are not easily recognized as fraud even by the people committing them. Many frauds begin as genuine optimism, turn into rationalization, and end in deliberate concealment. The semi-technical definition is “a deliberate misrepresentation of material fact that causes someone to act to their detriment and the deceiver’s benefit.” It is easily confused with incompetence, negligence, and bad luck. A startup that believed its technology would work and turned out to be wrong is a business failure. A startup that knew its technology did not work and told investors that it did is fraud. The difference is difficult to establish because people can deceive themselves, misremember events, or simply lie.

A Ponzi scheme appears to generate returns by paying early investors with money from later investors. Each successful payment increases the scheme’s credibility and attracts more investment. The schemer does not need to maintain a lie in the face of contradictory evidence: the evidence available to most participants is the evidence of payment, which is real. The scheme can only continue as long as new investment exceeds required payments. A long firm operates on a longer timescale. The fraudster builds a legitimate-seeming business, establishes a track record of reliable transactions and prompt payments, then uses that reputation to place large orders on credit, sells the goods quickly at a discount for cash, and disappears before creditors can collect. The victim’s mistake is not trusting the operator—the early trust was warranted. The mistake is failing to notice that the scale and urgency of later transactions is inconsistent with normal business.

Control fraud operates inside a legitimate company. An executive who controls a company can route contracts to related parties, manipulate reported earnings to maximize personal compensation, extract value through transactions that are difficult for outsiders to interpret, and maintain an appearance of legitimacy for years. William Black’s The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One described the role control fraud played in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, and how Reagan-era deregulation and permissive accounting standards made it possible (Black 2005). The auditors who certified the books were paid by the companies they audited, and had professional and commercial incentives to take management’s claims at face value.

Accounting fraud works because accounting requires judgment at every stage where fraud can be inserted. Revenue can be recognized early or late; assets can be valued on optimistic or conservative assumptions; liabilities can be disclosed prominently or buried in footnotes. Each choice meets professional standards and is individually defensible. The fraud comes from consistently choosing the most aggressive position in every ambiguous case. Auditors frequently fail to catch it because of the volume of material they must review, because their adversaries anticipate the tests that will be used, and because big accounting firms depend on their clients for income, which gives them a powerful reason not to find problems.

Wirecard made the pattern concrete. The German payments company, certified by top-tier auditors, fabricated approximately €1.9 billion in assets for years while Germany’s financial regulator attacked the journalists who raised alarms. When the fraud collapsed in 2020, the money turned out never to have existed. Its chief executive had not built a company. He had built an extremely convincing impression of one.

Extortion is the same business model with a different collection mechanism. The 2017 WannaCry attack encrypted hundreds of thousands of computers across 150 countries and demanded Bitcoin for decryption keys. Four years later, the DarkSide group shut down the Colonial Pipeline and demanded approximately $4.4 million; the company paid within hours. Modern ransomware groups operate on an affiliate model: core developers write the malware and maintain payment infrastructure, while affiliates handle the intrusions. Cybersecurity firms negotiate, and cyber insurance covers the payments, so the industry has reconstructed the kidnap-and-ransom market that Lloyd’s of London built for physical abductions in the 1990s. Both sides have an interest in the transaction completing cleanly.

3.12 Other Ways to Organize a Firm

The shareholder-owned corporation is treated as the natural form of a firm, but it is one choice among many, and the alternatives are durable institutions rather than seminar hypotheticals. A sole proprietorship is the simplest: one person owns it, operates it, and is personally liable for everything it does. A partnership divides ownership between two or more people; in a general partnership all partners share liability, while in a limited partnership the limited partners risk only what they invested. A limited liability corporation is the dominant modern form, and a public benefit corporation is a newer variant that legally requires the company to consider employees, communities, and the environment alongside shareholders. A cooperative is owned and governed by its members, whether those members are workers, customers, or both, with profits distributed in proportion to participation rather than capital invested. Consumer cooperatives own the firm on behalf of their customers; credit unions are owned by their depositors. The Islamic waqf is a charitable endowment whose property cannot be sold or inherited, and whose income must serve a specified purpose in perpetuity; at their peak in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, estimates suggest that as much as a third of agricultural land was held as waqf. Japan’s keiretsu are networks of interlocked companies that hold shares in one another, insulating management from hostile takeovers and rewarding long-term investment. Germany’s Mittelstand—medium-sized, family-owned manufacturers— pair multi-generational ownership with worker seats on supervisory boards. In India, the Hindu Undivided Family has been a recognized legal entity since the nineteenth century, and conglomerates such as Tata and Birla grew from structures in which the boundary between family and enterprise was deliberately blurred.

Cooperatives are the most direct challenge to the shareholder model. The Mondragón Corporation in the Basque region, founded in 1956 and employing roughly 80,000 people by 2024, is owned by its workers rather than outside shareholders (Morrison 1991). The credit-union tradition that began with Friedrich Raiffeisen in 1860s Germany now counts roughly a billion members worldwide (Whyte and Whyte 1991). These forms face real problems—raising capital without equity to sell, and the short time horizons of members who may not live to reap long-term investments— but they demonstrate that the investor-owned firm is a choice, not a law of nature.

Cooperatives face real problems. They cannot simply sell equity to outside investors, because they have nothing to sell: profits are distributed by participation, not by capital contributed, so an outside investor gets no proportional claim on future surplus or governance voice. Worker-members also have short time horizons, since a member’s stake ends when they leave or retire, which creates an incentive to distribute surplus now rather than reinvest it. Mondragón has partially solved this with indivisible reserves, a pool of retained earnings belonging to the cooperative collectively that no individual member can withdraw.

The franchise is the opposite arrangement: the franchisee puts capital at risk, while the franchisor keeps every significant decision. McDonald’s sets the menu, the supplier list, the pricing guidelines, the design specifications, and the standards against which a franchise can be audited and revoked. McDonald’s also, in most arrangements, owns the real estate and charges rent. Its revenue derives primarily from real estate, not food: the company acquires the land and building, leases them to the franchisee at rates that capture a substantial share of the location’s value, and collects royalties calculated as a percentage of gross sales rather than profit. The hamburgers are the mechanism by which the real estate and royalty revenue are generated. Platform fees work the same way: they are a take on gross transaction value, not on seller profit.

The choice is advertised more honestly than it is made. Multi-level marketing recruits people with the promise of entrepreneurship, but the US Federal Trade Commission found in a 2011 analysis that fewer than 1% of participants in one major MLM earned a net profit after expenses (FitzPatrick 2020). When Uber launched, it told drivers they were entrepreneurs, then set the prices, chose the rides, and deactivated accounts without meaningful appeal. Amazon Marketplace invites sellers to list products, observes exactly which products sell, and then launches competing Amazon Basics versions using the sales data it collected from the sellers it hosts. A market can be efficient and still concentrate benefits while diffusing harms. Efficiency is not fairness.

NoteTakeaway

There is no market without rules. The interesting questions are which rules exist, who wrote them, and who benefits. When markets fail, regulation is the standard correction, not an alien intrusion.

3.13 Exercises

Externality inventory.
Pick one social-media harm (polarization, teen anxiety, election misinformation). Identify the negative externality, who bears the cost, who captures the benefit, and why the price does not reflect the cost.
Public-good puzzle.
Classify “an informed electorate,” “trust in institutions,” and “online safety” as public goods. Explain the free-rider problem and why no single company has an incentive to produce them. What follows for who should produce them?
Information asymmetry.
Choose a feature such as a recommender, a “black box” credit or hiring model, or an ad auction. Who knows more, the operator or the user? What could close the gap: disclosure, audit, a right to explanation, or something else?
Natural monopoly.
Argue whether a dominant social network is a natural monopoly due to network effects, high switching costs, and/or data advantages). If it is, what follows for regulation?
Free market autopsy.
Find a product described as “the free market at work.” List every government rule (and private rule) it depends on related to property, contract, fraud, liability, and standards. Discuss: is “deregulation” ever actually the absence of rules?
Subsidy autopsy.
Pick a consumer product and list every government-funded technology inside it (the internet, GPS, voice recognition, vaccines). Then discuss who captured the profit and who paid the research bill.
Commons design.
Take a shared resource (an open-source project, a Wikipedia article, a neighborhood) and draft the design principles that keep it from turning into Hardin’s tragedy. Compare your list with Ostrom’s eight.