4  How People Actually Think

How do real humans make decisions, and how can that be exploited?

NoteLearning Objectives
  • Distinguish fast/automatic from slow/deliberate processing.
  • Name several biases and give an example of each in an online setting.
  • Explain how identity and group membership shape belief, and what that implies for “just show people the facts”.

Why did you click the last thing you clicked? The honest answer is usually not “because I weighed my options and chose rationally.” It is something closer to “because it was there, it looked familiar, and everyone else seemed to be clicking.” Most of what people do online is not the product of careful deliberation; it is the product of fast, automatic cognition, and fast, automatic cognition is predictable. Predictability is exploitability.

4.1 Two Systems, Many Biases

The psychologist Daniel Kahneman described two ways of thinking (Kahneman 2011). System 1 is fast, automatic, and associative: it is what lets you read a familiar face, flinch at a loud noise, or scroll without deciding to scroll. System 2 is slow, effortful, and deliberative: it is what you use to check a calculation, weigh a tradeoff, or resist the scroll. Most online behavior is System 1, which is why it is so predictable, and why it is so cheap to exploit at scale.

The simplest demonstration is a framing experiment Kahneman and Tversky ran in 1971. They told participants that a disease was expected to kill 600 people and asked them to choose between two public health programs. Program A would save exactly 200 people. Program B had a one-in-three chance of saving all 600 and a two-in-three chance of saving none. Most people chose A. Then the same choice was rephrased: Program C would result in exactly 400 deaths. Program D had a one-in-three chance that nobody would die and a two-in-three chance that all 600 would die. Statistically the programs are identical, but this time most people chose D. Nothing changed except how the outcomes were described.

Classical economics assumes that people are rational agents who consistently maximize utility. Behavioral economics showed that they deviate in predictable ways. The first problem is computational. Optimizing requires evaluating all possible options against all possible outcomes under all possible conditions. No one can do this, so people use what Herbert Simon called satisficing: they search until they find an option that is good enough, then stop. Simon called the underlying condition bounded rationality: people are rational within the limits of the information, time, and cognitive capacity they actually have.

The heuristics System 1 uses are usually adaptive. Nearby numbers are usually informative, so anchoring—the tendency to lean on the first number you see— usually helps. In one experiment, people spun a wheel rigged to land on 10 or 65, then estimated the percentage of African countries in the United Nations; those who had seen 65 guessed about 45 percent higher than those who had seen 10. They knew the wheel was random, but the number shaped their thinking anyway. This is why prosecutors set high anchor charges, why retailers display high “original” prices, and why the person who names the first number in a salary negotiation usually wins (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001).

The availability heuristic says that people estimate how likely something is by how easily examples come to mind. After a plane crash dominates the news, people overestimate the risk of flying, even though the statistics have not changed. Confirmation bias pushes people toward evidence that supports what they already believe, and the representativeness heuristic makes them judge by resemblance rather than base rates. None of these are bugs; they are features of a mind tuned for speed. But a feature is an exploit waiting to be found, and the attention economy has found them all.

Two more findings matter for understanding online behavior. The first is loss aversion: a loss produces roughly twice the emotional impact of an equivalent gain. Taxi drivers in New York and Singapore work longer hours on bad days, when earnings are below their daily target, and knock off early on good days— managing losses against a reference point rather than maximizing income. The second is hyperbolic discounting: an extremely steep preference for the present over any future point. This is why someone can genuinely plan to quit smoking next year while lighting a cigarette, and why gym memberships are purchased with full intention and then rarely used. Our future selves are strangers, and we are generous to ourselves and stingy with strangers.

4.2 People Care About Fairness

Imagine you are given ten dollars to split with a stranger. You can offer them any amount. If they accept, you both keep your shares; if they reject, neither of you gets anything. A purely self-interested stranger, according to classical economics, should accept any positive offer—even one dollar—because one dollar is better than nothing. When researchers ran this experiment across dozens of countries, they found that offers below thirty percent were rejected roughly half the time. People would rather walk away with nothing than accept an outcome they perceived as unfair. The experiment is called the ultimatum game, and its finding is no longer seriously contested.

Public goods games ask participants to contribute to a shared fund that pays out to everyone, including those who contribute nothing. Standard theory predicts that rational individuals will free-ride until the fund collapses. In practice, initial contribution rates are typically between forty and sixty percent, and when participants can identify and punish free-riders, contributions rise and stay high. People punish free-riders even when punishment costs them something, and they do it in one-shot interactions where no future reputation is at stake. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argued that humans evolved not just as individuals competing for resources but as groups competing against other groups. Cooperation within groups, enforced by altruistic punishment of defectors, was a successful evolutionary strategy. The emotions that sustain it—fairness, shame, indignation—are as deeply embedded as any appetite for self-interest (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Bregman 2020).

The self-interested model did not emerge from this evidence. It emerged from political argument, was later dressed in mathematics, and eventually achieved the status of dogma. The previous chapter traces that lineage from Hobbes through Spencer; the point here is that the model is not just wrong about how people think, but about what they want. None of this means humans are angels. Self-interested behavior is real. But so is cooperation, fairness, and punishment of norm violation. The question is which tendencies a given institutional design tends to elicit.

4.3 Belonging and Obedience

People do not hold beliefs only to be right; they hold them partly to belong. The psychologist Henri Tajfel found that merely assigning people to groups at random— by a coin flip, by an arbitrary label— was enough to produce in-group favoritism (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Once a belief is tied to membership in a group, changing it is not just an intellectual update; it is a social risk. Motivated reasoning is what happens next: the mind becomes a lawyer hired to defend a conclusion rather than a judge weighing evidence.

Social context can overpower private judgment outright. In Solomon Asch’s line-length studies, subjects who could plainly see that two lines were the same length still agreed with a roomful of confederates who said otherwise (Asch 1956). In Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments, sixty-five percent of subjects administered what they had been told was the maximum voltage to an unseen “learner,” because a person in a lab coat told them to (Milgram 1974). Milgram’s interpretation remains contested—his subjects were also following cues that this was a legitimate scientific procedure— but the core finding is robust: ordinary people will do harmful things when the social setting demands it. And the setting can be broken by a single dissenter. When one confederate refused to continue, compliance collapsed, because the social proof of refusal is as powerful as the social proof of compliance.

This is where moral differences become legible. Jonathan Haidt’s moral-foundations theory holds that different audiences weight different values—care, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity—differently (Haidt 2012). Two reasonable people can talk past each other about content moderation because one is reasoning from care and fairness while the other is reasoning from loyalty and authority. Persuasion that ignores which foundation the other person is standing on is not persuasion at all.

4.4 Status and the Social Self

What people want is not only things; it is position. In 2001, Norway made its tax records publicly searchable online, and Ricardo Perez-Truglia used the moment as a natural experiment (Perez-Truglia 2020). Absolute incomes did not change, but the well-being gap between higher- and lower-income Norwegians widened by 29 percent, because people could now see exactly where they stood relative to everyone else. Robert Frank found the same preference in the workplace: workers systematically accept lower total pay in exchange for higher rank within their peer group (Frank 1985). A programmer who is the best-paid person on a small team may prefer that to being a lower-ranked member of a higher-paying team. The empirical case that rank rather than income drives well-being has been built over two decades. An analysis of the British Household Panel Survey, which tracked thousands of households over many years, found that once income rank was included in the model, absolute income had no statistically significant effect on life satisfaction (Christopher J. Boyce and Moore 2010). What predicted whether someone was satisfied was where they stood compared to their peers.

Thorstein Veblen saw this a century earlier. In The Theory of the Leisure Class, he described conspicuous consumption: spending whose primary purpose is to signal social rank, and whose signal only works because it is costly (Veblen 1899). Veblen also described conspicuous leisure: in a world where most people have to do physical labor, being seen not to work is a status signal. As leisure became broadly available, the signal inverted. Today, being seen to be overworked and constantly in demand signals high status: the business traveler at the airport in the expensive suit checking email at midnight is the modern equivalent of the nineteenth-century aristocrat who never lifted anything heavy. Conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure share the same property: the signal works because it is costly.

NoteBeing Seen

Invisible labor like housework, mentoring junior colleagues, or smothering your feelings for the benefit of others has lower status. It is usually dumped on women, members of minoritized groups, and the economically disadvantaged, which creates a vicious circle.

Fred Hirsch later pointed out that some goods are inherently positional— their value depends on how few other people have them, and they cannot be democratized. An ocean view, a title, a degree from a selective school: these lose their value the moment everyone has one. Digital platforms have turned status into a continuous, quantified feed, where follower counts and reaction metrics do the work Veblen described, at a scale and refresh rate he could not have imagined.

Preferences themselves are not as given as economics pretends. Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, was hired by American Tobacco in 1929 to make women smoke. He staged a group of women lighting cigarettes on Fifth Avenue as “torches of freedom,” framing a taboo-breaking act as feminist defiance, and it worked (Bernays 2024). The same machinery operates at national scale. In South Korea, cosmetic surgery has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry drawing patients from across East and Southeast Asia. The most in-demand procedures track the standards of appearance disseminated through Korean entertainment products, which are themselves produced by a commercial industry with strong incentives to generate aspiration. In India, skin-lightening products generate annual revenues in the billions of dollars, sustained by advertising that associates lighter skin with success and social mobility. The market for these products does not reflect a natural preference. It reflects decades of advertising, colonial inheritance, and film industry imagery. Recommendation systems are the digital successor to this technique. They do not merely show you content that matches what you already want; they build a model of your pauses, clicks, and watch time, then serve content designed to maximize engagement. A recommendation system is also a preference-construction system, and the customer is never meant to arrive, because arrival would end the business model.

4.5 People Believe Stories, Not Spreadsheets

A colleague once observed that people want data but believe stories. This is why the most effective public-health campaigns present specific, named people in specific situations rather than statistics. It is also why industries that want to prevent belief change fund think tanks that produce reports full of data: the point is not to persuade on the merits, but to borrow the appearance of rigor. The fossil-fuel industry has run this operation for thirty years, and tech companies have learned the technique.

The deeper problem is that beliefs contested in public function primarily as signals of group identity (Lubrano 2025). The asymmetry is not dishonesty in the ordinary sense. People do not evaluate arguments neutrally. They are significantly better at identifying flaws in arguments that lead to conclusions they dislike than in arguments that lead to conclusions they support. A trained scientist who is also a gun owner will scrutinize studies on gun violence more skeptically than studies on climate change if their social circle treats the former as identity-threatening but not the latter. The biased scrutiny is real scrutiny; the flaws they find are often genuine. But the asymmetric attention means they have reached a conclusion before their evaluation begins. Holding the wrong belief does not just mean being misinformed; it means being outside the group, so the social cost of updating is often higher than the mental cost of staying wrong. The Facebook Papers, leaked by Frances Haugen in 2021, showed that the company’s own researchers knew Instagram was worsening mental health among teenage girls, and that its algorithms amplified outrage, and that the company chose not to act because acting would reduce engagement (Frenkel and Kang 2021). The people inside those organizations were not failing to understand the evidence. They were responding to incentives that made understanding expensive.

4.6 Nudges and the Attention Economy

If small changes in how choices are presented can have large effects, then choice architecture is a policy tool. When workers must actively opt in to a pension plan, participation runs around 50 to 60 percent; when they are enrolled unless they opt out, it rises to 80 to 90 percent, with no change to the financial terms. Britain’s automatic-enrollment reform of 2012 brought over ten million additional workers into workplace pensions, and the Behavioural Insights Team found that adding “nine out of ten people in your area pay their taxes on time” to a tax letter recovered tens of millions of pounds at essentially no cost (Thaler and Sunstein 2009).

The same science runs the attention economy in the other direction. Variable rewards, infinite scroll, manufactured urgency, disguised ads, social proof, and default nudges are all engineered to exploit known psychology. The distinction between a nudge and a shove is not in the mechanism but in whose interests the design serves. Automatic pension enrollment serves the worker; automatic subscription renewal that is hard to cancel serves the company. Every notification badge and “people who liked this also liked” recommendation is a behavioral intervention. A design choice is a psychological intervention, whether the designer acknowledges it or not.

4.7 The Corporation as a Moral Actor

In 2008, the legal scholar Joel Bakan asked Robert Hare, the psychologist who had spent four decades developing the clinical tools used to diagnose psychopathy, to evaluate a publicly traded corporation against his checklist as if it were a person (Bakan 2005). The checklist identifies individuals who are callously indifferent to harm they cause, skilled at charming and manipulating people, incapable of genuine guilt or remorse, unwilling to accept responsibility for failure, and willing to lie when they believe they can get away with it. Hare’s conclusion was that publicly traded corporations fit the profile.

The legal reason is fiduciary duty. In most jurisdictions, corporate executives are legally required to pursue shareholder interest, and a board that sacrificed profit to benefit workers or communities could be held liable. The entity is therefore prohibited from having a conscience in the way a person might. It can behave ethically when ethics is good for the brand, but not when the cost cannot be justified by future returns.

This argument becomes harder to sustain when you look at who rises to the top. Belinda Board and Katarina Fritzon surveyed 39 senior managers in the United Kingdom and compared their profiles to patients at Broadmoor, a high-security psychiatric hospital (Board and Fritzon 2005). The executives scored higher than the Broadmoor sample on three personality disorder traits: histrionic, narcissistic, and compulsive. The researchers called this pattern “successful psychopathy”: the traits that lead to hospitalization in their extreme form are, in a milder and better-managed form, associated with reaching senior management. Paul Babiak and Robert Hare estimated that roughly one percent of the general population meets the clinical threshold for psychopathy, while corporate managers cluster around three to four times that rate (Babiak and Hare 2019). Psychopaths perform exceptionally well in job interviews. They are confident, articulate, and skilled at saying what an interviewer wants to hear. Once hired, they are evaluated primarily on how they appear to those above them, and making a strong impression on a small number of people across a limited number of interactions is something psychopaths do better than almost anyone else.

Erving Goffman’s concept of impression management explains why organization size matters (Goffman 1959). In a small organization where everyone works closely together for years, your actual behavior is too visible. Colleagues know when you take credit for other people’s work and when your confident predictions turn out wrong. In a corporation with thousands of employees, promotions are decided by people with less direct contact. They evaluate presentations, meetings, secondhand reports, and impressions formed in a small number of interactions. This is precisely the environment where impression management is most valuable, and where the gap between managing impressions and performing well is hardest to detect.

Researchers who study the dark triad of psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism have consistently found that individuals high in these traits do well in the early and middle stages of corporate careers. Narcissists project confidence and vision. Machiavellians read and exploit organizational dynamics. Psychopaths absorb stress and make decisions that harm others without losing sleep. Each of these looks like leadership in moderation and over short time horizons. Failure occurs when a crisis requires something the dark triad cannot supply: integrity, honest self-criticism, or concern for people the leader does not need. Dutton’s research on which professions attract the most psychopaths put CEO at the top, followed by lawyer, media professional, salesperson, and surgeon (Dutton 2013). What these jobs share is high stakes, limited direct accountability, and the need to remain calm under pressure.

None of this means every large company is led by psychopaths, or that organizational scale inevitably produces moral failure. It means that the selection pressures of large hierarchies are not neutral. Hiring processes that rely heavily on interviews favor candidates who are good at interviews. Promotion decisions made by people with limited direct observation favor candidates who are good at being observed. Bad people come and go; structures that reward bad behavior reproduce themselves.

4.8 Moral Disengagement

The last piece of the puzzle is how good people do harmful work without feeling like bad people. Albert Bandura called the mechanism moral disengagement (Bandura 1999). It operates through euphemism, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and treating the harmed as abstractions. Bandura identified a larger set of mechanisms. Moral justification frames the harm as serving a higher purpose. Euphemistic labeling describes content-moderation failures as “trust and safety challenges.” Displacement of responsibility points elsewhere: the advertisers demanded this, the users clicked on it. Diffusion of responsibility distributes it across so many people that no single person feels it: the engineers wrote the algorithm, the product managers set the metrics, the executives approved the strategy. Treating teenage users primarily as engagement statistics does much of the same work as dehumanization. These mechanisms are not rationalizations invented after the fact (Bandura 1999). They are available in advance, and organizations learn to activate them. The phrase “we just build hammers” is the most common form in technology work. It frames engineers as neutral suppliers of capability, placing all responsibility on whoever chooses to use the tools. That framing collapses when you look at what the tools do. A recommendation algorithm trained to maximize engagement and deployed on a platform used by teenagers is not neutral the way a hammer is. It is a system designed to capture attention, running on knowledge about how human psychology responds to certain kinds of content, at a scale no individual user can resist or comprehend. The programmers who built it made choices about what to optimize, and their bosses approved those choices. The tech industry’s vocabulary is a catalogue of these moves: user data described as “exhaust,” manipulative design described as “engagement optimization,” surveillance described as “connecting people with relevant products.”

None of this requires individual villainy. The corporation and the people who rise within it are discussed above; the point here is that the system selects for the traits it rewards, and the traits it rewards are not always the ones it says it wants. Design that respects how people actually think is possible; design that exploits it is the business model of the attention economy.

NoteTakeaway

People are not broken computers: they are social animals with fast, fallible, identity-driven cognition. Design that respects this is possible; design that exploits it is the business model of the attention economy.

4.9 Exercises

Bias autopsy.
Take a recent online argument or viral post. Identify at least two specific biases at work (confirmation, availability, in-group signaling, anchoring) and say how the platform’s design amplified them.
Dark-pattern hunt.
In a product you use, find one dark pattern (forced continuity, disguised ads, manufactured urgency, infinite scroll, confirshaming). Name the psychological mechanism it exploits.
Identity check.
Think of a belief you hold partly because of group membership. Describe, honestly, what would happen to your social life if you changed it. Discuss what this implies for “if we just showed people the facts.”
Moral-foundations translation.
Pick a policy debate (e.g., whether to moderate misinformation). Argue it once from a care/fairness frame and once from a loyalty/authority/purity frame. Which audiences respond to which?
Design a nudge.
Choose a desirable online behavior (e.g., reading before sharing). Design one System 1 intervention (default, friction, social proof) and one System 2 intervention (education, disclosure). Predict which works better and why, then discuss the ethics of each.
Status check.
Identify one place where you compare yourself to others online (follower counts, salary, shipping speed). What does the comparison do to your satisfaction, and who benefits from keeping you in that comparison?
Nudge autopsy.
Find a default in a product you use (auto-renew, pre-checked boxes, a default privacy setting). Trace who set it, who benefits, and what the opt-out rate likely is.