6  Belief

How do people come to believe what they believe about the world?

NoteLearning Objectives
  • Distinguish agenda-setting from framing.
  • Describe the shift from human gatekeeping to algorithmic engagement and its consequences.
  • Apply a “manufacturing consent” lens to platform-era media.

What did you learn about the world this week, and who decided it was worth your attention? Most of what any of us knows about the world arrived through someone else’s selection— an editor, an algorithm, a friend’s repost— and that selection is not neutral. Belief is produced, not just discovered. Whoever controls the agenda and the frame controls a large part of what is thinkable.

6.1 From Gatekeepers to Platforms

For most of the twentieth century, a small number of editors and broadcasters decided what was newsworthy. That concentration had its own distortions: the gatekeepers were overwhelmingly white, male, and answerable to advertisers, and the range of stories they considered fit to print was narrow. But the system was at least legible: you could see who was making the decision.

Platforms replaced those gatekeepers with engagement-maximizing algorithms, and the concentration did not go away—it changed shape. The business model is older than the web. The penny press emerged in New York in the 1830s, when publishers realized that a one-cent newspaper could not sustain itself on subscriptions but could attract a large enough readership to sell advertising at a profit. The New York Sun was not selling information to readers; it was selling readers to advertisers. Sensational crime reporting, gossip, and human-interest stories were not editorial lapses: they built the audience that made the advertising worth buying. Every subsequent development in advertiser-funded media follows from this original structure. In the 1890s, the circulation war between William Randolph Hearst’s Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’s World showed what the model produces under pressure: crime, scandal, nationalist outrage, and stories written to provoke drove circulation, and each escalation forced a matching response. Neither publisher set out to destabilize democratic discourse; they just wanted to sell newspapers. Inflammatory journalism was the predictable output of two rational businesses responding to the same incentives (Campbell 2011; Nasaw 2000).

Interactive media makes the same logic more precise. Behavioral data lets advertisers target individuals rather than demographics, and the recommendation algorithm knows far more precisely than any editor what will hold your attention for the next few minutes. Because outrage, fear, and social comparison generate stronger engagement signals than accurate information, a platform that maximizes engagement will always amplify inflammatory distortion over mere facts (Wu 2016).

6.3 Framing and Agenda

Agenda-setting and framing are the two levers on what becomes thinkable. Agenda-setting is the choice of what gets discussed at all: media may not tell you what to think, but they tell you what to think about, and absence from the agenda is a form of power. Framing is the choice of how an issue is defined, which determines which answers seem reasonable. “Screen time” frames a social problem as a personal discipline problem; “attention extraction” frames the same phenomenon as an industry practice. “AI safety” frames the question as one of engineering; “corporate accountability” frames it as one of power. The reframe changes the feasible policy menu, which is why so much political argument is fought over words before it is fought over anything else.

John Kenneth Galbraith called this the dependence effect: advertising manufactures the wants that production then satisfies (Galbraith 1998). And representation changes what is thinkable. When Nichelle Nichols considered leaving Star Trek, Martin Luther King Jr. reportedly told her to stay, because her character Uhura was one of the few images of a Black woman in a position of authority on television; Whoopi Goldberg has said she saw herself in that image, and Mae Jemison has said it shaped her path toward becoming an astronaut. The Rooney Rule, which requires NFL teams to interview minority candidates, is the minimal-institutional version of the same idea: you cannot become what you cannot imagine, and you cannot imagine what is never shown.

6.5 The Ideology of the Future

The most consequential frame circulating in the technology industry right now is not about the present at all. The philosopher Émile Torres named a cluster of overlapping ideologies— transhumanism, rationalism, effective altruism, longtermism, and others— TESCREAL (Torres and Gebru 2024). Their shared premise is that the scale of the future is so vast that almost any present sacrifice can be justified if it plausibly improves long-run outcomes. If trillions of people could live across star systems over millions of years, then a donation that slightly reduces the probability of human extinction is worth more than a donation that cures a child of malaria today.

The case for taking the future seriously is not foolish. Utilitarians count welfare: if future people will exist, their suffering and flourishing count in the moral calculation, and since there could be many more future people than present ones, their aggregate welfare could outweigh ours. Rights theorists reach a similar conclusion from a different direction: if future people will have the same moral status as present people, then the fact that they do not exist yet is morally arbitrary in the same way that geographic distance is morally arbitrary. John Rawls asked readers to imagine designing a society without knowing what position they would occupy in it, and extended the thought experiment across generations: if you did not know which generation you would be born into, you would want rules that protected each generation from being stripped of resources by its predecessors (Rawls 1999). Edmund Burke described society as a partnership between the dead, the living, and those yet to be born (Burke 1790). These arguments are not identical, but they converge on the idea that our obligations extend beyond the people we can see and hear. What follows is not the longtermist conclusion. It is that the future deserves weight in present decisions, which is a much weaker claim than the one TESCREAL needs.

The arithmetic is straightforward given the premise; the problem is that the premise— that we can make meaningful probability estimates about civilization-scale outcomes centuries out— is speculation wearing the mathematical clothing of rigor. The deeper problem is structural. If the future swamps present obligations, then whoever controls the trajectory of the future has more moral authority than any present institution or democratic process. This is the framing that lets the already-powerful describe themselves as trustees of civilization, accountable to no present constituency, and justify present disruption and displacement as the price of a future whose beneficiaries do not yet exist. It is the same rhetorical structure as other forms of extraction, and it is most credible when the people making the argument are also bearing the sacrifice— which is rarely how it is deployed.

Isaiah Berlin spent much of his career analyzing how this kind of reasoning goes wrong. His book The Crooked Timber of Humanity took its title from Kant’s observation that “out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made” (Berlin 1991). Berlin argued that the goods people pursue are genuinely plural and genuinely irreconcilable. Liberty and equality pull against each other. Security and freedom pull against each other. Community and individuality pull against each other. These are not coordination problems awaiting a technical fix. They are permanent features of human life. The view Berlin argued against he called monism: the belief that freedom, utility, the glory of the nation, the arc of history, expected future welfare, or something else is the one supreme value, and that apparent conflicts between goods are ultimately solvable by reference to it. Monism is not just an abstract error. It is, Berlin argued, the philosophical root of political tyranny, not because monists are necessarily cruel, but because once you accept that one value is supreme, you can justify any present harm. If the supreme value is large enough—and nothing is larger than the welfare of all future humanity— the calculation can authorize anything done to anyone living now.

This is exactly the reasoning several tech billionaires have adopted. Elon Musk has described his accumulation of capital, media platforms, and satellite networks as necessary to prevent humanity from being locked into a bad long-run future. OpenAI’s founding mission to develop AI safely “for the benefit of all humanity” is a longtermist framing that positions the organization’s leadership as trustees of civilization accountable to no present constituency. The argument that today’s people must accept disruption, displacement, and concentrated power because future people’s welfare is at stake is being made by very wealthy people about costs borne by others who have no voice in the decision (Andreessen 2023). The material basis of democratic accountability weakens at the same time. Democratic governance rests on a bargain: the governed have things that their governors need—labor, taxes, and consumer spending. When value is generated by AI systems owned by a handful of corporations already expert at tax optimization, the tax base shrinks, consumer spending contracts, and collective bargaining fades. Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic, said it directly: “The balance of power of democracy is premised on the average person having leverage through creating economic value. If that’s not present, I think things become kind of scary.” The CEO of one of the leading AI companies is describing the technology he is building as a threat to the material basis of democratic governance. His company has not endorsed a single piece of legislation to address it (Piketty 2017; McGrann 2026).

6.6 Privacy as Framing

Privacy is not a single natural right; it is a contest over who gets to be private and who is watched. Privacy is also not a timeless natural right. As Sarah Igo describes, what is and is not private has expanded in some directions and contracted in others over the past century with no consistent underlying principle (Igo 2020). Sexual behavior between consenting adults was legally public well into the twentieth century, in the sense that it was criminally regulated. For much of the same time, medical records were routinely shared between physicians, employers, and insurers without patient consent. The expansion of legal privacy protection into both areas was the result of specific case-by-case struggles. The concept of a private individual self—a zone belonging to a person rather than to a household, a clan, or a community—is also historically recent and unevenly distributed (Jenkins 2024). In pre-modern Europe, the unit of privacy was the household, not the person, and the head of household had authority over what happened inside it. Women and servants had no separate private sphere. In Ottoman law, the harim designated the domestic sphere of the household as legally inviolable: not the “harem” of European fantasy, but a protection against state or community intrusion into the home. This was a meaningful protection, but it applied to the household as a unit, not to the individuals inside it. Japan’s distinction between uchi (inside) and soto (outside) organized public and private behavior very differently from Western individualism. The interior of the household was intensely private from outside scrutiny, but the expectation of individuals’ interior privacy was much weaker. Indigenous knowledge systems in many parts of the world operate through collective custodianship of sacred, medicinal, or ceremonial knowledge. This is a form of collective privacy: certain knowledge belongs to particular communities and is not available to outsiders. Colonial administrators treated this as obscurantism, and “freedom of information” in the colonial context often meant forced extraction: ceremonies documented, sacred objects removed, genealogies recorded for administrative purposes. Privacy as extraction is the mirror image of privacy as protection. Erving Goffman described social life as a performance with a front stage and a back stage (Goffman 1959). The back stage is where contradictions get worked out and the next performance is prepared, and a society without back stages is not one in which people become more authentic; it is one in which performance becomes continuous and exhausting. The chilling effect is measurable: after Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations (Snowden 2020), researchers documented a drop in Google searches for sensitive topics, not because people became less curious but because curiosity began to require calculation.

Surveillance rewires the people it surveils. The East German Stasi employed roughly 90,000 officers and a network of about 180,000 informal informants to watch a country of 16 million people, a ratio never matched before or since (Funder 2011). The Stasi had to coerce its informants; in the modern surveillance economy, we pay subscription fees for the privilege of being surveilled. The social location of privacy has always been uneven. The first American legal argument for a right to privacy, made by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, emerged from the needs of the prominent to be protected from gossip, not from the needs of the powerless to be protected from the state (Browne 2015). “Nothing to hide” is an argument made by people who have never needed a back stage. The feminist critique made the social location of privacy plain. The slogan “the personal is political,” associated with the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s, was a direct challenge to the liberal privacy argument. Women’s subordination was legally protected in the private sphere: marital rape was not a crime in most US states until the 1970s and 1980s, because marriage was treated as a private relationship outside legal scrutiny. Domestic violence was routinely treated as a private family matter. The claim that the state should not interfere in private relationships was, in practice, the claim that women had no recourse against husbands and fathers. The twentieth-century expansion of state intervention into domestic life was not an erosion of privacy but a redrawing of its boundaries. Feminists and child advocates demanded that the state enter spaces it had previously left to male authority. They were not anti-privacy; they were arguing that the women and children in those spaces deserved privacy from the men who controlled them. The same concept, applied by different actors, produced opposite conclusions.

The communitarian critique of privacy takes a different shape. Communities can provide forms of accountability that states cannot, and privacy can be an obstacle to that accountability. But this argument has a history of being deployed most aggressively against communities that were not the ones making it. In British India, child marriage prohibitions and widow protection laws were introduced in a framework that described Hindu family privacy as barbaric and in need of civilizing intervention. The language of accountability to higher norms was used to justify intrusion into the domestic practices of colonized people by administrators who had no sustained interest in the well-being of the women and children they claimed to protect. American privacy worked the same way domestically. Poor and immigrant families in the early twentieth century were subjected to social worker surveillance and home inspection regimes that middle-class families were not. Privacy, like other goods, was distributed in proportion to social power.

Exposure can also be a weapon. The charivari was a public shaming ritual practiced across medieval and early modern Europe, deploying community visibility as a disciplinary tool against people who violated social norms. The same mechanism operated in public struggle sessions during the Cultural Revolution, in the public confession practices of various religious traditions, and in contemporary doxxing. These vary in severity, but they share the same logic: the ability to protect against exposure is not a luxury but a precondition for social participation.

The asymmetry is clearest in financial secrecy. Switzerland’s banking-secrecy law of 1934 was enacted partly to protect Jewish depositors from the Nazis; within years it was protecting wealth hidden from its owners’ own governments, and then the loot of the Nazis themselves (Shaxson 2012). Gabriel Zucman estimates roughly $7.6 trillion sits in offshore accounts, costing governments about $200 billion a year in lost tax revenue (Zucman 2015). The Panama and Pandora Papers revealed the scale, but the system is legal because the wealthy have the influence to keep it legal.

Corporate secrecy operates the same way at a smaller scale. Non-disclosure agreements are legitimate when they protect trade secrets or the terms of a commercial negotiation. They become instruments of harm when used to prevent victims of sexual abuse and harassment from speaking. Harvey Weinstein’s non-disclosure agreements required victims’ silence as a condition of settlement. Both Weinstein and Jeffrey Epstein continued to harm additional people for years because the financial privacy of the settlement was used to suppress testimony that would have enabled legal action. The tobacco industry’s internal documents provide a decades-long parallel: company researchers produced evidence that cigarettes caused cancer and that nicotine was addictive, while the companies’ public-facing research denied what their private research showed. The deaths attributable to that gap between public claim and private knowledge are not a small number. State secrecy operates at the largest scale. Classification systems and executive privilege have been used to prevent accountability for torture. Every authoritarian government that has committed atrocities has used state secrecy as its first line of defense, while using forced transparency—public trials, published confessions—as a weapon against opponents. Privacy and exposure have always been deployed together, each in the direction of power.

The principle that threads through the cases is simple: privacy for persons, transparency for institutions. India’s Right to Information Act of 2005 gave citizens the right to demand government documents, born from village activists trying to verify whether public-works money was actually spent. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission inverted the logic of settlement, offering amnesty in exchange for full public disclosure. The European right to be forgotten protects the person whose private medical condition was published, and also the politician who wants voters to forget a corruption conviction. The same instrument serves both, and privacy law cannot always tell them apart.

6.7 Fragmentation and Panic

The popular story about platforms is that they sort people into sealed filter bubbles that never encounter disagreement. The empirical picture is more mixed than the alarm suggests: people do encounter opposing views, and the larger problem may be a shared but distorted diet rather than total separation. Rigor requires acknowledging that uncertainty rather than overclaiming it.

The same caution applies to the most common panic about what platforms do to communities. The evidence from disasters points in the opposite direction from the myth. Researchers including Enrico Quarantelli and Rebecca Solnit found that in the aftermath of earthquakes, floods, and fires, ordinary people overwhelmingly respond with cooperation and mutual aid, not barbarism (Solnit 2009; Quarantelli 1998). The “elite panic” story—looting, chaos, the need for armed control— is largely an artifact of authorities and media, who report the rare exception as the rule. Selection bias manufactures mistrust, and mistrust is a belief like any other: produced by someone, for someone, under particular incentives.

On the morning of December 6, 1917, a French munitions ship collided with a Norwegian vessel in Halifax Harbour, Nova Scotia. The explosion killed nearly two thousand people and flattened the north end of the city. It was the largest human-made explosion before the nuclear age. Within hours, survivors were pulling strangers from rubble, improvising hospitals in churches and railway stations, and sharing food with people they had never met. The next day a blizzard arrived. Residents of Truro, two hours away by train, loaded relief supplies and medical teams before anyone had formally organized them. People came from across eastern Canada and the northeastern United States, not because anyone had issued orders, but because other people needed help.

This is not the story most people expect. The version of human nature embedded in popular culture and reproduced in disaster coverage is that when things fall apart, so do people. Civilization is a thin crust over barbarity: scratch the surface and you get looting, assault, and the strong preying on the weak. This story is wrong in almost every particular, but it keeps being told because it serves purposes that have nothing to do with accuracy. E.L. Quarantelli spent decades studying disasters and concluded that panic and antisocial behavior are the exception, not the rule. Communities typically show increases in prosocial behavior: strangers help each other, crime rates generally fall, and people who were barely acquaintances briefly become something like a community. Rebecca Solnit documented the pattern across a century of catastrophes, including the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the 1917 Halifax explosion, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, September 11, and Hurricane Katrina (Solnit 2009; Quarantelli 1998).

Hurricane Katrina in 2005 produced the most extensively documented divergence between media narrative and documented reality in modern history. In the days after the storm, major news organizations reported roving gangs in the Superdome, mass rape, and snipers firing at rescue helicopters. Subsequent investigation found that the reported gang violence did not happen, the murder rate in the city did not spike, and most of the “looting” was people taking food and water to survive. But these lies had consequences. Hospitals delayed evacuating critically ill patients while waiting for military escorts. Trucks carrying food and water were turned back from routes deemed dangerous when they weren’t. A group of survivors trying to walk across the Crescent City Connection bridge to reach Gretna, where they had been told buses were waiting, were turned back at gunpoint by police who said they were keeping their community safe. The fiction of social breakdown caused deaths that the storm itself had not.

Solnit has a name for what happened in New Orleans: elite panic. Ordinary people in a disaster tend to behave with remarkable generosity and calm, but authorities and elites tend to panic—not about the disaster, but about the public. Since they believe that the social order that keeps them on top is only held together by the threat of force, a disaster that removes their ability to enforce their rules looks like the end of civilization. The gap between what happens and what gets reported is also explained by what counts as news. Editors choose what to show based on what will attract attention, and dramatic conflict attracts more attention than organized mutual aid. The result is systematic selection bias in disaster coverage. If the media consistently describes human nature as more violent and more selfish than it is, people are pre-conditioned to believe that cooperation is unlikely, which makes them less likely to cooperate.

NoteTakeaway

Belief is produced, not just discovered. Whoever controls the agenda and the frame controls a large part of what is thinkable. Platforms changed the economics of that production, and with it, the politics.

6.8 Exercises

Framing audit.
Find one story covered two ways (e.g., “misinformation” versus “platform accountability”). List the frames and metaphors, and note who is cast as the agent and who as the victim.
Agenda check.
Compare what a news outlet and a social-media feed surfaced about the same event. What was on the agenda, and what was conspicuously absent? Who benefits from that absence?
Propaganda filters today.
Take a tech-policy controversy. Walk through Herman and Chomsky’s five filters as updated for platforms, and identify which are most active in this case.
Manufacturing a panic.
Take a moral panic (e.g., kids and screens, “AI will end humanity”). Trace how news coverage and platform feeds frame it: which experts get quoted, what metaphors recur, who is cast as the villain. How does the framing amplify the alarm while suppressing the evidence?
Redesign the gatekeeper.
If you had to replace engagement maximization with a different editorial principle, what would it be? Name the new distortions it would introduce.
Privacy frame swap.
Take a surveillance story (ad targeting, workplace monitoring, a data breach) and retell it once from the “personal privacy” frame and once from the “power and institutions” frame. Who is the agent and who is the victim in each version?
Representation audit.
Pick a domain where one kind of person is overwhelmingly represented (an executive suite, a cast list, a dataset of “successful” people). What becomes thinkable when that changes, and what is the minimal intervention (like the Rooney Rule) that gets the change started?